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Aerial area bombardment is the policy of indiscriminate bombing of an enemy's cities,[citation needed] for the purpose of destroying the enemy's means of producing military materiel, communications, government centres and civilian morale. It differs from the use of bombs to destroy military targets. The practice came to prominence during World War II with the use of large numbers of unguided gravity bombs, often with a high proportion of incendiary bombs, to effect indiscriminate bombing of the target region – either to destroy personnel and/or materiel, or as a means to demoralize the enemy (see terror bombing). The high explosive bombs were often on timers and used to intimidate or kill firemen putting out the fires caused by the incendiaries. This, in high enough concentration was capable of producing a firestorm effect.[1] Initially, this was effected by multiple aircraft, often returning to the target in waves. Nowadays, a large bomber or missile can be used to create the same effect on a small area (an airfield, for example) by releasing a relatively large number of smaller bombs. The term obliteration bombing refers to area bombing of a large part of the city.[2] Another term for area bombing intended for the complete and indiscriminate destruction is "saturation bombing" or "carpet bombing".[citation needed] Contents 1 Before the area bombardment - origins of the concept 2 World War II 3 Vietnam War 4 First Gulf War 5 Aerial area bombardment and international law 6 See also 7 Notes 8 References 9 Further reading Before the area bombardment - origins of the concept German airship Schütte Lanz SL2 bombing Warsaw in 1914. The first instances of aerial bombing of cities occurred during the First World War with bombing attacks by Zeppelins over England. They were ineffective, but generated a wave of hysteria, partially attributed to media. This revealed the tactic's potential as a weapon that was of use for propagandists on both sides. Attacks continued and were also joined by heavier-than-air warplanes. These were relatively minor raids by later standards but had the effect of diverting resources of guns and aircraft to the defense of Great Britain. During the interwar period (1919–1939) the use of aerial bombing was developed as part of British colonial policy, with Hugh Trenchard as its leading proponent. In Iraq, about 1924, the techniques of so-called "Air Control" were developed – which included target marking and locating, as well as formation flying, by the "Trenchard school" which included Sir Charles Portal, Sir Arthur Harris, and Sidney Bufton. These early developments of aerial warfare led to two distinct branches in the writings of air warfare theorists: tactical air warfare and strategic air warfare. Tactical air warfare was developed as part of a combined-arms attack which would be developed to a significant degree by Germany, and which contributed much to the success of the Wehrmacht during the first four years (1939–42) of World War II. The German Luftwaffe became a major element of the German blitzkrieg. Three of the leading theorists of strategic air warfare, namely strategic bombing during this period were the Italian Giulio Douhet, the Trenchard school in Great Britain, and General Billy Mitchell in the United States. These theorists thought that aerial bombardment of an enemy's homeland would be an important part of future wars. Not only would such attacks weaken the enemy by destroying important military infrastructure, they would also break the morale of the civilian population, forcing their government to capitulate. Although area bombing theorists acknowledged that measures could be taken to defend against bombers – using fighter planes and antiaircraft artillery), the maxim of the times remained "the bomber will always get through". These theorists for strategic bombing argued that it would be necessary to develop a fleet of strategic bombers during peacetime, both to deter any potential enemy, and also in the case of a war, to be able to deliver devastating attacks on the enemy industries and cities while suffering from relatively few friendly casualties before victory was achieved.[3] The Imperial Japanese Army used aerial bombardment as a terror weapon in mainland China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. During the Spanish Civil War, the bombing of Guernica by German aviators including the Condor Legion, under Franco-Spanish command, resulted in the near destruction of that Spanish town, and casualties estimated to be between 500 and 1500 people. Though this figure was relatively small, aerial bombers and their weaponry were continually improving – already suggesting the devastation what was to come in the near future. World War II Area bombardment of cities and towns during World War II began[citation needed] with the German Luftwaffe's bombings of Warsaw, Frampol, and Wieluń during the Wehrmacht's conquest of Poland in September–October 1939. Warsaw, the Polish capital city, was heavily damaged (with 10% of all its buildings destroyed), and also two other Polish towns were heavily damaged. It is believed that Frampol had no targetable industry, and no military units were stationed there. In the case of Frampol, some historians believe that the Luftwaffe carried out that bombing as an experiment to determine how effective aerial bombardment could be. In his book, Eyes on the Sky, Wolfgang Schreyer wrote: "Frampol was chosen as an experimental object, because test bombers, flying at low speed, weren't endangered by AA fire. Also, the centrally placed town hall was an ideal orientation point for the crews. We watched possibility of orientation after visible signs, and also the size of village, what guaranteed that bombs nevertheless fall down on Frampol. From one side it should make easier the note of probe, from second side it should confirm the efficiency of used bombs." Of course, the overrunning of Poland did not end World War II, and after interlude of the Phoney War (the Sitzkrieg), combat continued. The German Wehrmacht war machine attacked the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, heavily bombing Rotterdam after the Dutch refused to surrender immediately. This bombing sent a powerful message to Holland and other countries, and as pre-war experts had predicted, aerial bombardment demonstrated its power as a tool of persuasion. The Dutch government quickly surrendered. Next, the Wehrmacht, with strong tactical support from the Luftwaffe, quickly overran France during the spring of 1940, even though the French Army had the support of the British Army in Belgium and northern France. However, the Luftwaffe did not have to resort to the large-scale bombing of any French cities to compel the surrender of the French government, and the removal of the British Army from France in the Evacuation of Dunkirk. The Luftwaffe gained control of a large number of formerly French air bases from which to threaten the United Kingdom Still, the British government and the British Empire resolved to keep fighting against Germany. During the summer of 1940, Hitler unleashed the Luftwaffe, under the command of Hermann Goering against Great Britain in what the British called The Blitz, which set off the Battle of Britain between the Luftwaffe and the British defenses: the fighter planes of the Royal Air Force. The Blitz tapered off from September 1940 into 1941. With the victory of the Royal Air Force above Great Britain over the Luftwaffe, Adolf Hitler decided instead to launch a huge invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) during the spring of 1941 – hoping to quickly overwhelm the Red Army, forcing the Soviet Union to surrender and to cede a huge amount of land (in Ukraine, Belarus, etc.) to Germany. However, this did not become so because the Red Army retreated thousands of miles but kept on fighting. During the time of Opearation Barbarossa, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force turned to and refined the brutal strategy of area bombardment of German cities. Without any armed forces remaining on Continental Europe, this area bombardment campaign became central to the British effort to make war on Germany. However, the air superiority of the Luftwaffe over Continental Europe in the daytime compelled the Royal Air Force's long-range heavy bombers to only fly over and attack Germany during the night time. This was how the situation remained over Europe during 1940, 1941, and most of 1942. Just days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Germany declared war on the United States, which in turn entered the war against Germany – but both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) were woefully unprepared for war in Europe. It took over half of 1942 for the USAAF to do several things: a). Manufacture more heavy bombers, especially the B-17 Flying Fortress, b). Move B-17s from the area of the Pacific Ocean, and c). Move bombers, ground support crews, air crews, aerial bombs and other weapons across the Atlantic Ocean to their new bases in England. With all of this to accomplish, the first air raid by the USAAD on Europe, in the fall of 1942, consisted of only 12 B-17s, and it was carried out on a railroad yard in France – not in Germany. Its B-17 bombers were called the "Flying Fortress" because of their heavy defensive armament of ten to twelve .50 caliber machine guns, and their armor plating in vital locations. With all of this, the USAAF's commanders in Washington, DC, and in Great Britain adopted the strategy of taking on the Luftwaffe head on, in larger and larger air raids by mutually defending bombers, flying over Germany, Austria, and France at high altitudes during the daytime. Also, both the U.S. Government and its Army Air Forces commanders were reluctant to bomb enemy cities and towns indiscriminately. They further thought that by using the B-17 and the advanced Norden bombsight, the USAAF should be able to carry out precise attacks on German factories and other locations that were vital to the German war machine: factories that manufactured the vital tanks, warplanes, trucks, artillery pieces, ball bearings, munitions, railroad equipment, etc., plus naval bases, shipyards, railroad junctions and railroad yards, electric power plants, steel mills, airfields, etc. However, brutal experience during 1942–43 (and earlier) showed the USAAF, the RAF, and the RCAF that precision bombing from high altitudes during the daytime, and also at night from any altitude, was very difficult to impossible to accomplish. Also, during this time the Luftwaffe's daytime fighters put up strong opposition to the unescorted USAAF bombers over Germany. For example, in the two large air raids on one day in September against German ball bearing and airplane factories in southeastern Germany, more than 90 USAAF B-17s were shot down by the Luftwaffe. These were discoveries that forced all three of the western Air Forces further away from precision bombing as a war-winning strategy. By this time the de Havilland Mosquito light bomber had entered service with the RAF. Though it was unarmed and carried a much smaller payload than the heavy bombers, if the calculation were done, it could be shown that, in sufficient numbers, it could deliver the same tonnage of bombs for less cost and less loss of aircrewmen. This indeed did prove to be the case as RAF post-war analysis showed the Mosquito as being 4.5 times less costly to run than the Lancaster per ton of bombs delivered. Due to the Mosqito's speed (which made it difficult for Luftwaffe fighters to intercept) it could operate in daylight and precision bombing on a large scale may have been possible if Mosquito production had been prioritised over that of heavy bombers. There was prejudice against unarmed bombers in the RAF and the RAF had been slow to learn from early Bomber Command failures. The RAF could also have benefitted from understanding the Luftwaffe's failures and successes during the Battle of Britain, those who could have contributed most were swept aside during the Big Wing controversy immediately after the Battle of Britain. The purpose of the area bombardment of cities was laid out in a British Air Staff paper, dated September 23, 1941: "The ultimate aim of an attack on a town area is to break the morale of the population which occupies it. To ensure this, we must achieve two things: first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction and (ii) fear of death."[4] This directive is also documented in the response of the Chief of Air Staff Charles Portal April 5, 1945, to Winston Churchill's letter on area bombing, written after Churchill had expressed his concern, in a telegram first submitted on 28 March 1945, but then withdrawn, redrafted, and resubmitted on 1 April 1945:[5] The primary object of the Combined Bomber Offensive laid down in the Casablanca directive of the 21st January, 1943, was “the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic systems and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”[6] This response goes on to assure Churchill: "We appreciate the importance of refraining from the unnecessary destruction of towns and facilities which will be needed by our own troops or for Allied reconstruction purposes." Professor Lindemann was liked and trusted by Winston Churchill. Churchill appointed him the British government's leading scientific adviser with a seat in the Cabinet. In 1942, Lindemann presented the "dehousing paper" to the Cabinet advocating the area bombardment of German cities in a strategic bombing campaign. It was accepted by the Cabinet and Air Marshal Harris was appointed to carry out the task. It became an important part of the total war waged against Germany. Professor Lindemann's paper put forward the theory of attacking major industrial centres in order to deliberately destroy as many homes and houses as possible. Working class homes were to be targeted because they had a higher density and fire storms were more likely. This would displace the German workforce and reduce their ability to work. His calculations (which have been questioned) showed that the RAF's Bomber Command would be able to destroy the majority of German houses located in cities quite quickly. The plan was highly controversial even before it started, but the Cabinet thought that bombing was the only option available to directly attack Germany (as a major invasion of the continent was almost two years away), and the Soviets were demanding that the Western Allies do something to relieve the pressure on the Eastern Front. Few in Britain opposed this policy, but there were three notable opponents in Parliament, Bishop George Bell and the Labour MPs Richard Stokes and Alfred Salter. The remains of German town of Wesel after intensive allied area bombing in 1945 (destruction rate 98% of all buildings) Though it was never explicitly declared, the nearest that the British got to a declaration of unrestricted aerial bombing was in an area bombing directive by the Air Ministry issued to RAF Bomber Command on 14 February 1942, which said "You are accordingly authorised to use your forces without restriction", and then listing a series of "Primary targets" which included Essen, Duisburg, Düsseldorf, and Cologne. "Secondary targets" included Braunschweig, Lübeck, Rostock, Bremen, Kiel, Hanover, Frankfurt, Mannheim, Stuttgart, and Schweinfurt. This "area bombing directive" stated that "Operations should now be focused on the morale of the enemy civilian population, and in particular, the industrial workers". Lest there be any confusion, Sir Charles Portal wrote to Air Chief Marshal Norman Bottomley on 15 February "..I suppose it is clear that the aiming points will be the built-up areas, and not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories" The first true practical demonstrations were in the night from 28 to 29 March 1942, when 234 aircraft bombed with incendiaries the ancient Hanseatic port of Lübeck (Main article: Bombing of Lübeck in World War II). This target was chosen not because it was an important military target, but in fact because it was unimportant, lightly defended, and in Harris's words "built more like a fire lighter than a city". The ancient timber structures burned well, and the raid destroyed most of the city's centre. A few days later, Rostock suffered the same fate. However, the most startlingly destructive examples of area bombing were the "thousand-bomber raids". Bomber Command was able by organization and drafting in as many aircraft as possible to assemble very large forces which could then attack a single area, overwhelming the defences. The aircraft would be staggered so that they would arrive over the target in succession: the "bomber stream". On 30 May 1942, between 0047 and 0225 hours, in Operation Millennium 1,046 bombers dropped over 2,000 tons of high explosive and incendiaries on the medieval town of Cologne, and the resulting fires burned it from end to end. The devastation was nearly total. The fires could be seen 600 miles away at an altitude of 20,000 feet. Some 3,300 houses were destroyed, and 10,000 were damaged. 12,000 separate fires raged destroying 36 factories, damaging 270 more, and leaving 45,000 people with nowhere to live or to work. Only 384 civilians and 85 soldiers were killed, but thousands evacuated the city. Bomber Command lost 40 bombers. Two further thousand-bomber raids were conducted over Essen and Bremen, but neither so utterly shook both sides as the scale of the destruction at Cologne and Hamburg. The effects of the massive raids using a combination of blockbuster bombs (to blow off roofs) and incendiaries (to start the fires) created firestorms in some cities. The most extreme examples of which were caused by Operation Gomorrah, the mass bombing of Hamburg, (45,000 dead), attack on Kassel (10,000 dead), the attack on Darmstadt (12,500 dead), the attack on Pforzheim (21,200 dead), the attack on Swinemuende (23,000 dead) and the attack on Dresden (35,000 dead). Even larger USAAF B-29 Superfortress bombers attacking Japan during the War in the Pacific created the same firestorms in the readily flammable Japanese cities such as Tokyo (approximately 120,000 people killed). Vietnam War During the Vietnam War, the Americans, due to their inability to gain the upper hand against a guerrilla war conducted by the Vietcong, resorted to area bombing the forests and villages with Napalm and Agent Orange, in order to deprive the Vietcong of their jungle cover, but to no avail. Also, as troops were being removed, saturation bombing campaigns occurred to try and destroy more surface area than conventional bombing campaigns. The rules of engagement said villages were never to be bombed, but critics say that wayward bombs did hit villages. First Gulf War Precision bombing in the sense of tactical bombing had been the case from the start of aerial use of bombs. It was in World War II that the use of precision bombing for strategic targets was developed (see Dambusters and Tallboy bomb). The developments in guided munitions meant that the Coalition forces in the First Gulf War in 1990 were able to use them, although the majority – 93%[7] – of bombs dropped in that conflict were still conventional, unguided bombs. This has not ended aerial area bombardment completely, because it has been used several times since as a means of softening up front line enemy positions. Aerial area bombardment and international law Main article: Aerial bombardment and international law Air warfare, must comply with laws and customs of war, including international humanitarian law by protecting the victims of the conflict and refraining from attacks on protected persons.[7] These restraints on aerial warfare are covered by the general laws of war, because unlike war on land and at sea—which are specifically covered by rules such as the Hague Regulations and Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions, which contain pertinent restrictions, prohibitions and guidelines—there are no treaties specific to aerial warfare.[7] To be legal aerial operations must comply with the principles of humanitarian law: military necessity, distinction, and proportionality:[7] An attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy, it must be an attack on a military objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. See also Aerial bombing of cities Carpet bombing Civilian casualties of strategic bombing High-level bombing Precision-guided munition Strategic bombing Tactical bombing Notes ^ Harris, Arthur "Bomber Offensive; (First edition Collins 1947) Pen & Sword military classics 2005; ISBN 1-84415-210-3 ^ a b Primoratz, edited by Igor (2010). Terror from the sky : the bombing of German cities in World War II (1. publ. ed.). New York: Berghahn Books. pp. 45-53. ISBN 1845456874. http://books.google.com/books?id=m_rUckiR62kC&lpg=PA53&dq=Obliteration%20bombing&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false.  ^ Alf Wilkinson Bomber Theory: Air Power Between Two World Wars ^ Bomber Command and Ethics (PDF) page 13 ^ Churchill's redrafted letter on area bombing ^ Area Bombing: Note by Chief of the Air Staff 5 April 1945 (Catalogue ref: CAB 120/303) Chief of Air Staff Charles Portal response to Churchill's letter on area bombing" ^ a b c d e Francisco Javier Guisández Gómez, a colonel of the Spanish Air Force, ICRC: "The Law of Air Warfare" International Review of the Red Cross no 323, p. 347–363 References Jefferson D. Reynolds. "Collateral Damage on the 21st century battlefield: Enemy exploitation of the law of armed conflict, and the struggle for a moral high ground". Air Force Law Review Volume 56, 2005(PDF) pp. 4–108 Charles Rousseau, Le droit des conflits armés Editions Pedone, Paris, (1983) Further reading Grayling, A. C. (2006). Among the Dead Cities. New York: Walker Publishing Company Inc.. ISBN 0-8027-1471-4.  Gene Dannen. International Law on the Bombing of Civilians Joan T. Phillips. List of documents and web links relating to the law of armed conflict in air and space operations, May 2006, via archive.org. Bibliographer, Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Maxwell (United States) Air Force Base, Alabama. Hansen, Randall (2008). Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942–1945. Toronto: Doubleday Canada. ISBN 9780385664035.  Sherwood Ross. How the United States Reversed Its Policy on Bombing Civilians, The Humanist, Vol. 65, July–August 2005 R.J. Rummel. Was World War II American Urban Bombing Democide? Casablanca directive Spaight. James M. "Bombing Vindicated" G. Bles, 1944. ASIN: B0007IVW7K (Spaight was Principal Assistant Secretary of the Air Ministry (U.K)) Kevin Young,[1] "The Path to Hiroshima and Nagasaki – Targeting Civilians", CounterPunch, August 9–10, 2008